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l. Introduction 
This paper wiH focus on four leading cases settled by the Brazilian National 
Petroleum Agency (ANP) between 2000 and 2001. The first two cases, involving 
TBG, the company that runs the Bolivia-Brazil Natural Gas Pipeline, GASBOL, 
and ENERSIL, an Enron group subsidiary, were related to the same contract of 
interruptible gas transportation. 1 These were the leading cases in Brazil regarding 
the application of the provision of Article 58 of the Brazilian "Petroleum Act" 
which imposed the open access regime to the pipelines and offshore terminals of 
Oil & Gas in Brazil, as well as the !cading case regarding interruptible gas 
transportation services. 
The subsequent two cases involved TBG and a company by the name of 
British Gas do Brasil. The first case regarded an interruptible transportation service 
contract and was based on the principle of non, discrimination. Additionally, it 
followed the basic lines traced by the ENERSIL cases. 1l1e second one was the first 
case where the open access regime to gas pipelines was applied concerning firm 
services. 
The fOllowing questions are going to be discussed throughout the paper: 
1. How the liberal concepts of Oil & Gas markets were interpreted in 
Brazil, after their recent adoption? 
2. Could this interpretation be expected, in accordance to the 
international standards of Oil & Gas market? 
3. What are the possible influences of these cases'in the Brazilian/South 
American Oil & Gas market? Are foreign companies encouraged to make 
investments in the South American natural gas market? 
1 According to this type of contract, the transportation company is liable to deliver a certain 
quantity of gas to the contractor provided that there is a surplus after the companies that signed 
contracts for uninterruptible supply (firm contracts) received the gas quantities they were entitled 
to. The uninterruptible service contracts are those by which the transportation company is obliged 
to reserve enough transportation capacity through the pipelines to comply with the contractors 
demands within the stipulated period. 
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II. The Bolivia~Brazil Pipeline 
The Bolivia~Brazil pipeline is 3,150 kilometers long and connects the cities 
of Santa Cruz de la Sierra in Bolivia to Porto Alegre in Brazil. lt has the capacity 
to transport 30 million m3 of gas on a daily basis. The pipes are between 16 and 32 
inches wide. There are two different routes: the northern route connects Corumba 
to Guararcma and the southern route connects Campinas to Canoas. The operation 
of the pipeline in the Brazilian territory is made by 0 1h;tnsportadora Brasileira 
Gasoduto Bolivia~Brasil S.A."- TBG and in the Bolivian territory by Gas 
Trans boliviano S.A. - GTB. Both have the same shareholders, with different stakes 
in each. In TBG, Petro bras, through its subsidiary Gaspetro, has 51% of the 
shares; BBPP Holdings has 29% (British Gas, 9,66%; BHP, 9,66% and El Paso 
Energy, 9,66%); 1hlnsredes 12% (Fondos de PensiOn Bolivianos, 6%; Shell, YX1; 
Ehron, 3%), Shell 4%, and Enron 4%. At GTB, Transrcdcs has 51% (Fondos de 
PensiOn Bolivianos, 25,5%; Shell, 12,75% and Enron 12,75°/tJ), Enron, 17% Shell, 
17% Gaspetro, 9% and BBPP, 6% (British Gas, 2% BHP, 2% and El Paso Energy, 
2%). The total amount invested in the pipeLine was about US$ 2.2 billion; US$ 
1. 7 billion of which was in BraziLl 
The actual operation and control of the pipeline is made by satellite at 
TBG's Supervision and Control Center in Rio de Janeiro. The pipeline started to 
be operated in July 1999. By then, only the northern route was in use. In March 
2000, the southern route began its operations. With both routes in operation, 
there are 26 delivery points in Brazil. 3 
Argentina used to be the main importer of natural gas from Bolivia. After 
the drastic increase in Argentinean gas reserves beginning in the late 1970's, the 
country became self~sufficient. Therefore, Bolivia, which is highly dependent upon 
gas exportation, focused on the Brazilian market. The demand for gas in the 
metropolitan areas of the southeast and southern Brazil increased in the late 1980's. 
In the early 1990's the government approved a report that affirmed the necessity 
that natural gas had a 12% share in the Brazilian primary energy consumption by 
2010. The best alternative to accomplish this goal was to start to import gas from 
Bolivia. 
The pipeline was origimllly conceived as a means of transporting the gas 
that would be bought by Pctrobras from Yacimientos Petrolfferos Fiscales Bolivianos 
(YPFB). As of August I 996, Pctrobras agreed to buy 8 million m3 of gas a day 
from YPFB on a take-or-pay basis. The Transportation Caj3acity Quantity (TCQ) 
should reach 16 million m3 a day on the eighth year and keep on this level until the 
2 Financing structure: World Bank, US$ 310 million; Inter-American Development Bank, US$ 240 
million; Corporaci6n Andina de Fomentos (CAF), US$ 165 million; National Economic and 
Social Development Bank (BNDES), US$ 760 million; European Investment Bank, US$ 60 million; 
Agencies of Credit to Exports, US$ 360 million. 
3 ANP's "Monthly Natural Gas Buiietin", January 2003. 
Dispute Sc-t.-Llencent Under tLe Braz-ilian Petroleurn Agency - ANP: A Cu.sc-bw 339 
Overview Concerning dw Open Access to tbe Bolivia-BmziJ Natural Gas Pipeline 
20th year. ln the same contract, Petro bras was granted the right of first refusal to additional 
quantities of gas until the limit of30 million m3 of gas a day, if these quantities were not 
necessary to supply the Bolivian domestic market. 
The contract also contained provisions that created the TransJJortation 
Capacity Option - TCO. This option was accepted by Petrobras after the 
construction of the pipeline began. Therefore, Pctrobras was granted the right to 
transport an additional 6 million m3 of gas a day, supra the contractual quantities 
limits, paying only the operational transportation costs and the related necessary 
investment on infrastructure. The National Social and Economic Development 
Bank of Brazil (BNDES) took part in the negotiations to finance the payment, 
which should be made in advance. The Bank financed the payment for this option 
with the condition that the gas would be supplied for thermoelectric power plants. 
TCX (Transporwtion Capacity Extra) is the transportation capacity beyond 
TCQ (including the options accepted) and TCO, until the limit of 30 million m3 of 
gas a clay. Petrobras contracted this capacity also. 
TCY is the capacity beyond the 30 million m3 of gas a day, which can be 
achieved through new investments in the pipdine. 
These contracts were the object of intense discussion in the cases that arc 
going to be considered infra. 
III, The Brazilian National Petroleum Agency and its role ~The Legal 
Framework used to decide the cases 
The Brazilian National Petroleum Agency, ANP, is responsible for regulating 
Oil & Gas in BraziL According to its own description of its role\ ANP has to 
ensure that the rules regarding Oil & Gas arc clear enough to boost the investors' 
confidence. Further, it affirms that the goal is to promote free competition in the 
supply of natural gas ffom inside or outside the country. Moreover, it has to ensure 
that the open access principle is respected and to provide the necessary information 
for the players in order to develop the market. Its most significant role, however, 
is to administer the transition between a growing market (which was a monopolistic 
one until very recently) to a developed, mature one characterized by free competition. 
The Brazilian Constitution estabtishcs in its Article 255 that the states are 
responsible for the local development of gas pipelines. Therefore, regulation of the 
Brazilian gas industry is made by both state and federal governfnents, according to 
specific rules of competence. 
The fundamental Oil & Gas legal framework in Brazil is the Brazilian 
Petroleum Act6 of 1997. This statute establishes the basic principles that concern 
4 http://www .anp. gov. br/gas/index .asp 
5 As provided by the Constitutional Amendment number 5 of 15 August 1995. 
6 Lei 9.478, of 6 August 1997, "Lei do Petr61eo" 
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the Oil & Gas market. Detailed legislation is issued by ANP, which was created by this 
statute. 
Article 58 of the Act introduced the open access principle in the Brazilian Oil & 
Gas market. This principle was regulated by the Order ANP ng 169/987 during the period 
between November 1998 and April2001. This Order was valid during the period in which 
the cases that arc going to be analyzed were decided. 
Due to the energy crisis that occurred in Brazil in 2001, a new statute had 
to be passed in accordance with the 11 Prioritary Thermoelectricity Program"8• This 
was Order ANP nQ098/01, a temporary order that introduced just part of the 
proposed legislation regarding the expansion of the pipeline's capacity. After that, 
ANP opted to divide the themes regarding the open access regulation. Therefore, 
five projects were offered for public consultation9• 
The principles and legal basis used to settle the disputes infra are contained 
by the Brazilian Petroleum Act (Lei n" 9.478) and by Order ANP n" 169/98. 
The most important provisions follow. 
Brazilian Petroleum Act, Article 1: 
"The national policies for the rational use of energy resources will aim at 
the following objectives: 
VI ~ increase, in an economic basis, the use of natural gas; 
IX ~ promote free competition; 
X ~ attract investment in energy generation;" 
Article 58: 
"Any interested party will be given the right to use the existing or to be built 
pipelines and off~ shore terminals, if adequate payment is made to the owner. 
§ 1" ANP will set the price and form of payment if the parties do not reach 
an agreement upon it; it has also the duty to verify if the price agreed is compatible 
to the market price." 
Order ANP n" 169/98, Article 3: 
iiThe tran_o;porter will permit non~discriminatory access to any interested 
third party to the available capacity and to the idle contracted capacity in its gas 
transport facilities." 
7 
"Portaria ANP no 169/98" 
6 
"Programa Prioritario de Termoeletricidade". 
9 Order on open access, Order on the Criteria to define the Tariffs of Natural Gas Transportation, Order 
on Dispute Resolution, Order on the Information that transporters and marketers have to disclose to 
ANP. the Markel and the Marketers, Order on the cession of natural gas transportation capacity. 
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IV. Dispute Settlement 
a. Cases Concerning the Interruptible Gas Transportation Service 
i. ENERS!L v. TBG 
EN ERSIL and TBG concluded a contract of interruptible gas transportation 
service on 29 September 2000. According to the contract, a quantity of l million 
m3 of gas a day should be transported by TBG from Bolivia to the pipeline's 
interconnection with the GASPAL pipeline in Guararema, State of Sao Paulo, 
Brazil. 
This contract was only signed after a dispute resolution proceeding asked 
for by ENERS!L and conducted by ANP settled the disagreements between ENERS!L 
and TBG. The issue concerned some contractual clauses on which the parties had 
not reached an agreement: Price and the service's Terms and General Conditions 
(TCG). A special commission was created by ANP to settle the dispute. The 
Commission fixed the price that should be charged by TBG in the interruptible 
transportation servicej based on Article 58 of the Brazilian Petroleum Act. 
In 21 November 2000, ENERSIL asked again for ANP's intervention. This 
time the company was seeking the approval of an amendment to the contract. The 
amendment was requested by the company the day the original contract was being 
signed. TBG rejected the terms of the request and ENERSJL sought to resolve the 
issue by arbitration under ANP. ENERSIL requested the inclusion of another twelve 
delivery points located between the original reception and delivery points and the 
inclusion of a clause by which the contract would be automatically renovated every 
year. 
During the proceedings, TBG had to provide information to ANP that 
explained why it rejected ENEI\Sll.:s request. It argued that by accepting the request) 
it would face legal and financial difficulties. According to TBG, the provisions of 
the original contract would attenuate these difficulties, since under it, there would 
be a single delivery point without transportation capacity restrictions and a distance 
factor close to one would apply. 
After efforts made by the parties and technicians of ANP to avoid an 
arbitration, ANP designated the SCG!G to settle the dispute, 
According to the SCG, the inclusion of new delivery points was totally in 
accordance to the legal principles that applied to the case. The fact that this would 
have effects over some of the mechanisms adopted in the Resolution that settled 
the first dispute between the companies constituted no sufficient basis for the 
rejection of ENERSI~s request. ANP's approach was rather to adapt such 
mechanisms in order to conform to the new specificities of the contract, if it was 
10 ANP's Superintendence of Natural Gas Commercialization and Transportation, "Superintendencia 
de Comercializacao e Movimentacao de Gas Natural". 
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found necessary. A summary of the issues discussed in the cases involving EN ERSIL and 
TBG is presented infra. 
1. Distance Factor 
This factor was first introduced by the decision made by ANP's special 
commission in the original dispute between ENERSIL and TBG. It was in 
accordance with Article 10 of Order ANP n9 169/98, which provided that the 
price paid for the gas transportation service should reflect the distances between 
the reception and the delivery points. The concern of TBG here was the all new 
delivery points were closer to the receipt point than the original one and, therefore, 
the per unit price paid by ENERSIL would be lower with regard to those in 
comparison to the unit price paid for gas transported to the original delivery point. 
The decision was that the distance factor should not be altered. 
TBG appealed this decision and proposed a different method of calculating 
the distance factor. This method would not have the same negative impact over the 
companls financial situation. According to the appellate body, some premises 
included by TBG in this method were highly subjective and complex in its 
application. Therefore, the appellate body decided to maintain SCG's decision. 
2. Contract Term 
The SCG decided that the clause that provided for the automatic renovation 
of the contract every year, as required by ENERSIL, should be included in the 
contract. Nevertheless, a 0.5% annual rate increase should apply. The justification 
for this was that the interruptible transport price was based on the firm transport 
price and the latter requires such an annual readjustment. 
3. Discount Factor 
In the first resolution, the special commission decided to impose a discount 
factor to the contract between ENERSlL and TBG. This factor would apply to 
compensate the lTWrkctcr for any interruption in the transportation of gas. The 
factor was the division between the number of days in a month with reduction or 
interruption of service and the total number of days in the month. Therefore, if a 
certain or even minimal reduction occurred in 12 days in a month of 31 days, the 
marketer would have approximately a 38% discount. TBG did not agree to such a 
provision since it could lead to excessive discount. TBG used this to justify their 
refusal to ENERSII.:s contractual amendment request. The SCG agreed to eliminate 
this factor. 
4. Load Factor 
This factor typically applies to firm gas transportation contracts. The idea 
behind it is that the more gas the marketer takes in a determined period until the 
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limit contracted) the less it will cost for it per unit. ANP decided that it would apply to 
intenuptible contracts because of the improbability that there would not be any interruption 
in TBG's transportation service, because of lack of demand in the initial stages of the 
project. 11 
According to ANP's determination regarding the first dispute settlement 
between TBG and ENERSIL, this factor would vary between 80% and 100% applied 
on the base price for firm transportation contracts) according to the take of gas by 
the marketer in comparison to the quantity of gas contracted to be supplied in an 
interruptible basis. 
The controversy arose when ENERSIL applied for the connncncement of 
arbitration by ANP. As explained supra) ENERSIL wanted to include in its 
interruptible transportation contract with TBG some additional receipt points. If 
applied in a variable form like explained above, ENERSIL could allocate its 
contracted gas quantity according to its own will in different receipt points. This 
would make it very probable that EN ERSIL would usually get a 100% load factor) 
which would be unfair to TBG. 
There were two solutions for this: one was to demand contracted quantities 
for each point of delivery from ENERSIL; the other1 to set an a JJriori percentage 
that would apply to each and every interruptible contract. Due to the technical 
difficulties and costs that the application of first solution would result in) the second 
one was picked. Hence, the SCG decided that a 90% tariff would apply, regardless 
the take made by the marketer. 
5. Terms and General Conditions 
a. Gas for system use 
TBG alleged that the provisions of the contract signed with ENERSIL would 
expose TBG to commercial loss because it would have to replace the gas fOr use in 
the system. Therefore, TBG proposed to ANP that the original marketer, Petro bras, 
would be responsible for supplying the gas used in the system to transport its 
contracted quantity and that all other rnarketers would supply the gas needed to 
transport their gas in a pro rata basis. The SCG decided that this would be 
discriminatory and that aH marketers should pay in a jJro rata basis 1 without making 
any distinction between old and new marketers. 
In its appeal, TBG again alleged that if it had to transport gas to ENERSIL 
as provided in the latter's requesc it would bear the risk of not having sufficient 
gas to run the system, because ENERSIL was not contractually bound to supply it 
and because TBG was legally forbidden to buy gas. In the appeaL TBG simply 
1
' The SCG cited a decision National Energy Board of Canada (document RH~3-86), which states 
that it is unfair that a marketer contracting an interruptible service that receives gas without 
interruption, pays less than one that contracts a firm service. 
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stated that should this problem occur, it would request ANP's intervention. The appellate 
body replied that TBG had the right to buy gas if this problem occurs according to its 
interpretation of Article 12 of Order ANP 169/98. According to this Article, the transporter 
has the right to buy gas for its own consumption. 
b. Priorities Schedule 
TBG alleged that the GASBOL contracts provide that the original marketer 
should have preference in the allocation of gas quantities. Thus, it proposed that 
the TCG should reflect that, so that the new marketers would have a lower priority 
in comparison to the original marketer, even if the service were the same. The 
SCG decided that this would be discrintinatory: the only distinction regarding 
priorities should be the one between companies that contracted interruptible or 
firm gas transportation services contracts. 
This decision was appealed by TBG. It argued that the provisions of the 
prior contracts signed with Pctrobras were in explicit conflict with the decision. 
TBG allegedly would have to violate either the decision or the contract provisions 
in order to comply with one or the other. The appellate body contended that if the 
financial effects of the decision were such as to make it impossible for the company 
to comply with the provisions of the prior contracts, than it should negotiate with 
Petrobras to) accordingly, change these contracts. 
ii. BG v. TBG 
On 14 December 2000, British Gas do Brasil Ltda. (BG) requested assistance 
of ANP to solve the dispute that it was having with TBG. 
BG had requested TBG's interruptible gas transportation service. It requested 
the transportation of 0)8 million m3 a day for the period between April and August 
2001, and I ,0 million m 3 a day for the period between September 2001 and 
December 2003. 
The receipt point should be Corumba and there would be eight delivery 
points 12 • 
BG rejected TBG's contract and TCG proposal because it was significantly 
different from the one concluded between TBG and ENERSIL. 
According to BG, TBG's proposal was discriminatory, because it was treating 
two companies in the same situation differently. Therefore, BG requested ANP's 
intervention to compel TBG to offer a contract and TCG with the same clauses 
and in the conditions as the ones concluded between TBG and ENERSIL, which 
were homologated by ANP. Hence) the same prices and calculation methods should 
apply. 
12 ltatiba, Guararema, Guararema lnterconexao, Americana, Limeira, Sumare, Campinas, and 
Rio Claro. 
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ANP)s response was that it would compel TBO to offer the same clauses and 
conditions that would prevail after the settlement of the second dispute between EN ERSIL 
andTBG. 
The SCG decided that the same contracts should be offered both to ENERSIL 
and BG, based on the non~discrimination principle. The original contract between 
ENERSIL and TBG should be used as a model because both companies eventually 
requested contracts by which gas should be delivered to many delivery points. 
Therefore, the case was decided on the same bases as the second one between 
ENERSIL and TBG. Some brief remarks on the issues regarding this case arc 
presented infra. 
BG requested that the contract should be valid between April 200 l and 
December 2003. The SCG decided on the same basis as the case between ENERSIL 
and TBG) stating that the contract should be valid for one year and should contain 
an automatic renovation dause. Moreover, the same 0.5% annual rate increase 
should apply. 
The SCG granted BG's right to have gas delivered to a multiple number of 
delivery points based on the open access principle. Having the second dispute 
resolution between ENERSIL and TBG as a benchmark, the SCG decided that the 
load factor that should apply to BG's contract was the same, namely, 90% on the 
"relevant firm contracts price". In its prior commentaries) BG agreed with a fixed 
load factor) but, according to it) it should not be lower than 100%. 
The discount factor was eliminated as it was with regard to ENERSII.:s 
contract. Also based upon that decision, the SCG decided that the distance factor 
should apply. 
b. Case Concerning the Finn Gas Transportation Service 
i. BG v. TBG 
On 14 December 2000, the same date that BG requested the resolution of 
its conflict with TBG regarding an interruptible transportation contract; it requested 
the resolution of a conflict with the same company regarding a short~term firm 
transportation contract. 
BG had requested TBG the transportation of 0. 7 miHion m3 a day from 
April 2001 until August 2001 and 2.1 million m3 a day, to be transported from 
September 2001 until December 2003. The reception and delivery points would 
be the same as provided in the interruptible contract. 
TBG responded to BG)s transportation request saying that it would not be 
able to comply with it because it allegedly had no available capacity for the period 
because the contracts renegotiation with its original marketer were not finished. 
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Until the renegotiation was finished, all capacity would be destined to the contracts with 
the original marketer: 
BG found that this conduct was a procrastination destined to maintain transportation 
capacity out of market in order to protect its main shareholder interest. 
The main issue under discussion in this case was the inconsistency of the data 
regarding the pipeline's capacity presented by TBG. In different moments, TBG presented 
dWCrent data; it would change the data because of new factors and new negotiations 
with its original marketer and then just present the previous numbers again without giving 
any explanation. Therefore, it was impossible fOr market players to know exactly what the 
available capacity of the pipeline was. TBG would allegedly rely on this confusion in order 
to deny access to interested parties and protect Petrobras' interest. Infra, a description of 
the inconsistency will be presented. 
Complying with Article 9 of Order ANP nQ 169/98, TBG presented to ANP the 
transportation contracts that it had concluded with its original marketer Petro bras. A 
chart explained the contracted capacities for the TCQ, TCO and TCX contracts for 
each year between 1999 and 2019. The first problem verified was that the contracted 
quantities were not allocated for each delivery point. :J This means that Petro bras could 
allocate the quantities according to its own will at different delivery points. This was 
found to make it almost impossible to determine what the available capacity was, since, 
according to the contract, Petrobras coutd at any time decide that the whole capacity 
technically deliverable to a determined delivery point should be delivered to it, leaving no 
space for other marketers. ANP decided that TBG and Petrobras should change their 
contracts in order to specif\r the contracted quantities for each delivery point. 
The second problem was that this first set of data provided by TBG was inconsistent 
with the declared capacity of GASBOL Therefore, the contracted capacity was higher 
than the pipelines capacity so that the available capacity was "negative" between the 
years of2001 and 2006. These would make the open access to companies other than 
Petro bras impossible. 
After that) on December 1999) TBG sent a revised chart to ANI~ explaining 
that it had changed the potency of some compressors from 7,000 hp to 15,000 hp. 
This would have the single effect of making it possible for TBG to transport all the 
contracted capacity of Petrobras. Nevertheless, it would still be impossible for 
third companies to use the pipeline's transportation service, since all pipeline's 
capacity was contracted by Petrobras. 
Not only was this information a blunder if an open access pipeline was 
desirable, but also it was completely inconsistent with information provided by 
TBG three months later, on March 2000. Responding to ENERSIL:s request to have an 
interruptible transportation service) TBG did not infonn it that it had no availabte capacity, 
but rather, that because it had so much available capacity to transport gas, it could offer 
10 As provided by Article 2 of Order ANP no 169198. 
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EN ERSiL a service by which the latter would pay only by the quantities taken, like the 
interruptible service. The difference in this proposition was that TBG would guarantee 
that there would be no interruption in the service, as nornully provided in finn contracts. 
TBG informed EN ERSIL that it would have a large available capacity during the ramp~up 
period. 
Two months later, following ENERSI[s insistence on having an interruptible 
transportation service, TBG rejected it again because it supposedly had sufficient 
capacity in the next years to offer a short~term firm contract. 
ANP requested of TBG a clarification as to why TBG mentioned that it had 
available capacity if the data previously sent to the regulatory agency did not show 
that. TBG responded that it had to postpone for 2003 the TCO and the take or pay 
provisions of the TCX contract with Pctrobras, creating, thus, available capacity. 
The new chart sent to ANI; contained different data concerning the contracted 
capacity for the TCQ contract and the maximum capacity for the year 1999. 
According to TBG, at the same time that it was postponing for 2003 the TCO and 
TCX capacities, it was anticipating the maximum capacity of 18 million m3 a day 
of the TCQ contract from 2007 to 2004. 
On May 2000, after a request from ANB TBG had to publish in papers, the 
contracted, and the available capacities for the year 2000. According to it, the 
available capacity was 7.9 million m3 a day. The problem was that 12 days later, 
TBG informed ANP that the published data was wrong since the quantity of gas 
needed for its own consumption was not included in the calculations. 
Following BG's request for ANP to settle the dispute between it and TBG, 
ANP ordered TBG to provide detailed information on the up~to~datc capacity of 
the pipeline and its evolution until it reached 30 million m3 a day, as foreseen in 
the original project. TBG responded that the capacity evolution is intrinsically 
related to the contractual requirements. This affinnation was bizarre, si.nce TBG 
was actually tailoring the evolution of capacity to the contracts of one single customer, 
Petro bras, and was not projecting the demand of other companies. 
Subsequently, TBG sent new data to ANR which changed again the projected 
capacities for numbers that were present in the original projections. Moreover, the 
information contained a new type of capacity contract named TCO/X, which was 
simply not explained. Without justiflcation, TBG once again presented different 
data. 
During the proceedings, BG was requested by ANP to inform the wanted 
capacity for each delivery point. After receiving this information, ANP Ordered 
TBG to offer a contract to BG with the capacities that it informed. 
On February 2001, ANP requested TBG to provide clarifications on why there 
had been so many inconsistencies in the data that it issued before. ANP a!so requested 
information that clarified the evolution of the capacity in the pipeline, the last version of 
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the "Thermo Hydraulic Simulation Reportn, as well as a!! information, premises and 
hypothesis used to calculate the capacity of the pipeline. 
TBG responded that the "apparent inconsistency" in the data was due to the fact 
that one important compressor had not yet been installed in the Bolivian part of the 
project. That was the first time that this reason was raised by TBG. 
Another interesting point is that while analyzing the last version of the 
~<Thermo Hydraulic Simulation Reportn, ANP discovered that the capacity of 30 
million m 3 a day included also gas from Bacia de Campos, in the Rio de Janeiro 
State and from Santos, in the State of Sao Paulo. Moreover, the existing pipelines 
from the Southeast region of Brazil were also regarded as being part of GASBOL. 
According to BG, ANP should take the conflict of interests between Petro bras 
and TBG into account and assure that the actions purported to TBG would not 
aim the protection of the original marketer, In fact, in its decision, ANP stated 
that TBG had always acted in a manner to protect its main shareholder from 
competitors, while procrastinating decisions and rejecting requests. According to 
ANP, the aim of this behavior was to give time to Petro bras to sign contracts with 
different state companies. Thus, Petrobras would consolidate its position before 
competitors had a chance to develop their own business, since these contracts 
normally have terms of 20 years. 
ANP also affirmed that the inconsistent information given by TBG illustrated 
that it was not a company interested in developing its business by efficiently using 
its pipeline, and conquering new customers. According to ANP, the access to the 
pipeline should be broad and non~discriminatory. TBG should act as an independent 
company. ANP also stressed that legislation should be enacted in order to limit the 
participation of marketers as transporter's shareholder with voting rights. 
ANP also avowed that the TBCJ's decision to postpone the pipeline's capacity 
ramp~up in order to supply only Petrobras' demand was discriminatory because it 
ignored the demand of other interested companies. 
An audit committee was designated by ANP to verify the actual capacity of 
the pipeline. 
TBG contended that it could not comply with ANP's decision that it should, 
cogether with Petrobras, specify the contracted capacity for each delivery point 
because this was a bilateral relation. The appellate body simply extended the order 
to Petrobras as well. 
c. Comments on the Issues Underlying the Cases 
The real dispute underlying the four cases is the dispute between the oil 
multinationals and Petrobras to acquire market share that could last as long as 20 
years. The more time TBCJ would take to permit the participation of multinationals, the 
more contracts with state distributors its controtler would have. Petro bras aim was to 
maintain de facto its monopoly as a marketer. It would accomplish its goal, at least with 
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regard to GASBOL, if it had time enough and transport capacity enough to conclude 
contracts with the local marketers. 
The argument against the attitude of TBG was that its controller and main 
stockholder, Petrobras, is also the original marketer and, therefore, the conflict of 
interests in the companies is clear. Petro bras wanted to remain as the main marketer 
and acted within TBG to accomplish its goats. TBG and Petro bras agreed to speed 
up the schedule of extension of the pipelines capacity. However, at the same time, 
TBG was rejecting the offers of BG and ENERS!L. Both actions would make it 
possible for Petrobras to conclude more contracts with the state distribution 
companies. Since these contracts usually last for 20 years, when the competing 
companies such as BG and ENERSIL were granted the right to carry gas thru TBG 
pipelines, they would have a very narrow market, while Petrobras would retain the 
great majority of contracts with the state distributors. 
One argument that of course was not cited in any TBG petition, but could 
be read in press reports 14 was that Petrobras made most of the investments 15 to 
build the pipeline and, thus, would have the right to explore it and make profits 
that it generates, at least for a certain period, so as to recover the investn1ent made 
and be able to set~off the debt to the financers. Therefore, it would be unjust to let 
companies that had a minor participation during the construction period make 
the profits. Following this argument, Petrobras aim was not to recover the 
investment by the profits made by TBG only, but also by the profits that it would 
make as a marketer. Actually, the question whether TBG and Petro bras were vertically 
integrated was not asked during the dispute settlement proceedings. 
Companies that want gas from Bolivia to be sold in markets such as Sao 
Paulo or Rio Grande do Sul have no choice but to contract with TBG. The open 
access system in Brazil has the role of preventing the monopolist company from 
discriminating and barring the access for companies that wish to use the service. 
In an environment of many transportation companies, the need for open access, 
although important, would probably not be so great: interested marketers would 
have more bargaining power to win contracts since competing transportation 
companies could accept the contractual substance denied by the original 
transportation company. Therefore, the open access system in Brazil plays the 
important role of mitigating the problems that can occur due to the existence of a 
monopoly in the transportation business. 
14 In "Revista !sto E", in its issue number 1645, for example. 
15 It is important to stress that Petrobras has not yet recovered its original investment in TBG and 
owes many borrowers that contributed t 
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v Conclusion 
A great concern of multinationals while dealing with foreign developing markets 
is that the foreign country provides a legal framework that protects principles well assented 
in the most developed markets. Throughout the paper, it could be noticed that not only 
has Brazil a legal framework compatible to the international Oil & Gas standards, but also, 
and more importantly, it applies the set oflegislation through ANP. 
ANP's role as the dispute settlement body sponsor was of extreme importance to 
assure that the otxn access was guaranteed. All decisions were based on legislation enacted 
by Congress and by the agency itself. In one of the decisions, the agency expressed that it 
had discretion to decide whether to apply the legislation enacted by lt, taking into account 
the market factors, the macroeconomic environment, and the financial outcomes that 
the decision may produce. This statement should be regarded as a means of protecting 
market players in exceptional situations. It should not be interpreted as a risk that legislation 
is not applied. Moreover, as it is implied in the statement, the regulatory agency does not 
have the same discretion towards legislation enacted by Congress. 
It could be argued that the decision made by ANP reflected a political environment 
that favored the participation of foreign companies in the preceding federal government. 
The Brazilian federal government today could be characterized as not being as free 
nurket oriented as the former one. Nevertheless, no significant changes are expected. 
Even though there is no staTe decisis in the Brazilian legal system or, specifically, in 
administrative law, the principles applied to the cases are well assented within the regulatory 
agency doctrine and should be further applied. 
The decisions boost domestic and international confidence in the Brazilian 
regulatory system and make the Brazilian and South American environment more 
investor friendly. 
